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MARSHALL MISCONSTRUED: ACTIVIST?
PARTISAN? REACTIONARY?
JEAN EDWARD SMITH*

It is a distinct privilege to conclude the symposium of the
John Marshall Law School on the Life and Jurisprudence of Chief
Justice John Marshall. The papers presented ranged widely over
Marshall's judicial career, and illustrate the unparalleled
contribution of the great Chief Justice to American jurisprudence.
Perhaps, in that context, I might remind you of some of the
characteristics Marshall brought to the bench when he was
appointed Chief Justice of the United States in 1801. Namely:
" A total lack of judicial experience;
" A widely circulated reputation for indolence; and,
* An unquenchable thirst for Madeira.
Of course, he also brought to the Court what Senator Rufus
King of New York called "the best organized mind of his
generation."' He had experience at the highest levels of both the
executive and legislative branches of government, serving as
Secretary of State at the time of his appointment, and before that
as the floor leader of the Adams Federalists in the House of
Representatives. He had already carved out a career as the most
successful appellate lawyer in Virginia -then the most populous
state in the Union- frequently working in tandem with Patrick
Henry in some of the most important cases of the era. He was the
personal attorney of George Washington and George Mason, and
served as the principal lawyer for most Virginians (including
Thomas Jefferson) in the British debt cases of the early 1790s. He
had distinguished himself in a trying diplomatic mission to Paris,
besting French foreign minister Talleyrand in the famous XYZ
affair, thereby setting the stage for the Convention of
Mortefontaine, terminating the naval war with France, and
*

Jean Edward Smith, author of John Marshall: Definer of a Nation, is

the John Marshall Professor of Political Science at Marshall University. This

article relays the closing remarks given at the symposium on Chief Justice
John Marshall.
1. Letter from Rufus King to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (Oct. 17, 1797),
in 2 THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING, at 234-235, (Charles R.
King, ed., New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1894). King's comment was made
after listening to Marshall present Virginia's unsuccessful appeal to the
Supreme Court in the British debts case. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199
(1797). This was the only case Marshall argued before the Supreme Court.
1109
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restoring the fortunes of the Federalist party in the United States.
As for the reputation for lassitude (a reputation Marshall
carefully cultivated), House Speaker Theodore Sedgwick put it
best when he said Marshall was "attached to pleasures, with
convivial habits strongly fixed. He [was] indolent, therefore, but
when aroused, he [had] strong reasoning powers. They [were]
indeed almost unequalled."2
Two other personal characteristics, if I may, that often go
unnoticed. Marshall was the eldest of fifteen siblings. Riding
herd on a fractious band of brothers and sisters on the Virginia
frontier was not the worst experience he might have had when it
came to dealing with a contentious set of colleagues like William
Johnson, Joseph Story, and Brockholst Livingston -whom I
believe is the only Associate Justice to have killed a man in a duel.
The other point I would like to make is that Marshall brought
to the bench a modesty and self-deprecation that was as unusual
as it was captivating. "The first impression of a stranger," Justice
Story wrote,
Was generally one of disappointment. It hardly seemed credible
that such simplicity should be the accompaniment of such
acknowledge greatness. Meet him on a stagecoach, as a stranger,
and travel with him a whole day, and you would only be stuck by his
readiness to administer to the accommodation of others, and his
anxiety to appropriate the least to himself. Be with him, the
unknown guest at an inn, and he seemed adjusted to the very scene,
resigning himself without complaint to the meanest arrangement.
You would never suspect, in either case, that he was a great man;
far less that he was the Chief Justice of the United States.3
It would be presumptuous of me to speak to an audience of
Marshall scholars about the Chief Justice's jurisprudence. What I
would like to do is to address some of the misconceptions that have
grown up around Marshall over the years, and to return to
primary sources in appraising his tenure. Let me simply title my
remarks, "Marshall Misconstrued." Was he a judicial activist?
Was he a political partisan on the bench? Was he an economic and
social reactionary?
Whenever I speak about Marshall, especially in a law school
setting, I am always afraid there will be a host of people in the
audience who know more about the Chief Justice than I do. I
recall the time, a few years ago, when Sir Isaiah Berlin was
visiting Toronto. We were speaking over dinner about giving
2. Letter from Theodore Sedgwick to Rufus King (May 11, 1800), in 3 THE
LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING, at 235-238 (Charles R. King,

Ed.,

1894).

3. Eulogy from Justice Story for John Marshall to the Sulfolk County
[Massachusetts] Bar, (Oct. 15, 1835), in 3 JOHN MARSHALL: LIFE, CHARACTER,
AND JUDICIAL SERVICES 363-364 (John F. Dillon, ed. 1903).
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formal lectures, and Sir Isaiah said, "Jean, don't worry about it.
There will always be someone in the audience who knows more
about the subject than you do."
Well, I would like to ask that person to leave.
Perceptions of Marshall have varied substantially over the
years. At the time of his death in 1835, and into the 1840s and
'50s, he was the revered Chief Justice who had converted a weak
and fragmented Supreme Court into the custodian of
constitutional legitimacy. During the latter half of the nineteenth
century and into the early twentieth century, he was the
venerated statesman who arrested the centrifugal force of states'
rights and provided the constitutional underpinning for national
unity. Memories of the Civil War were fresh, and Marshall was
correctly appreciated for having changed the way the Constitution
was viewed: from a compact among the states to an agreement
arising from the people.
Revisionism set in just before the First World War. This was
a time of progressivism in American historiography. Jefferson's
image was gilded, and Marshall underwent eclipse. The Chief
Justice was portrayed as a committed political partisan on the
bench, a judicial activist, and a reactionary. The three writers
most responsible for these portrayals were, in my view, Albert
Beveridge, Edward S. Corwin, and Benjamin Wright. Senator
Beveridge, a prominent progressive historian in the tradition of
Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, was also a highly
partisan two-term Republican senator from Indiana who hated
Thomas Jefferson with an incredible passion. His four-volume
biography of Marshall (which won the Pulitzer Prize in 1920)
recast the Chief Justice in his own image of Republican
partisanship.
Every action Marshall took, every decision he
wrote, was rendered by Beveridge as a blow against Jeffersonian
democracy. It is not unusual for biographers to read their own
prejudices into their subject. And in Beveridge's case, Marshall
became a political activist: a judge who converted the Court into a
bastion of Federalism.
Beveridge was abetted by Professor Edward S. Corwin of
Princeton. Considered by many to have been the dean of
constitutional law scholars, Corwin was a true friend of executive
power and a super-patriot who was luke-warm, if not
contemptuous, of civil liberty.5 Writing in the aftermath of World
4. See generally 1-4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL

(1903).
5. See generally Edward S. Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press Under
the First Amendment: A Resume, 30 YALE L.J. 48 (1920-21); Edward S.
Corwin, Constitutional Law in 1919-1920, 14 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 656 (1920);
Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the SelfIncrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 191, 205-206 (1930) (illustrating
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War I, he condemned Marshall's handling of the Burr trial as
motivated by partisanship and the Chief Justice's contempt for
Thomas Jefferson. As Corwin would have it, Marshall simply
didn't understand the law of treason -and by that, he meant the
common law concept of constructive treason- and he was timid
about bringing a traitor to justice. In Corwin's view, Marshall's
emphasis on the constitutional definition of treason -namely, an
overt act testified to by two witnesses in open court- made it
impossible to convict anyone.
Professor Benjamin Wright of Harvard, a prominent
progressive and a committed Jeffersonian, took Marshall to task
for stretching the Contract Clause far beyond the intent of the
Framers when he applied it to the State of Georgia in Fletcher v.
Peck, the great Yazoo lands case in 1810.' Like Beveridge and
Corwin, Wright saw Marshall's decision as motivated by
partisanship, and that interpretation has become standard fare in
the textbooks of Con Law students for three generations. The fact
that Wright tailored his analysis from whole cloth is beside the
point.
For concreteness, let me address a number of specific
misconceptions about Marshall that have influenced the way we
view the Chief Justice. Some trace to Beveridge, others to Corwin
and Wright, and some are common to all three. All seem to be
grounded in the perception that Marshall was a fine politician but
a poor lawyer; that he possessed, at best, a shoddy legal education
and was unfamiliar with the precedents of common law.8
Corwin's critique of latitudinarian interpretations of the Bill of Rights).
6. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION 98-

111 (1919). But see ROBERT K. FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN

MARSHALL 272-277 (1968) (criticizing Crowin's stance).
7. See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION 28-34 (1938). But see Wallace Mendelson, B.F. Wright on the
Contract Clause: A Progressive Misreading of the Marshall-Taney Era, 38 W.
POL. Q. 262-275 (1985); Nathan Issacs, John Marshall on Contracts:A Study
in Early American Judicial Theory, 7 VA. L. REV. 413-418 (1921) (criticizing

Wright's interpretation).
8. 2 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 178-180 (19161919).

The argument that Marshall was unfamiliar with common law

precedent was first made by Albert Beveridge, who, for whatever reason,
sought to emphasize Marshall's political sagacity and downplay his legal

talent. Id. Beveridge cited no evidence other than a 1841 law review article
by Gustavus Schmidt. See Gustavas Schmidt, Reminiscences of the Late Chief
Justice Marshall, 1 LA. L. J. 80 (1841). In fact, Beveridge miscited Schmidt.
What Schmidt said was:

The extent of Mr. Marshalls [sic] legal attainments is sufficiently
attested by his decisions... which on account of the familiar
acquaintance they display with the principles of international, public,
and common law, and the perspicuity and elegance of their style, as well
as the convincing force of their reasoning must be viewed as models of
judicial eloquence. And yet, Mr. Marshall can hardly be regarded as a
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The fact is, Marshall possessed a superb legal education for
the time. In 1780, he attended the second series of lectures given
by Chancellor George Wythe at William & Mary. This was the
first formal program in legal education offered in the United
States. Aside from the Hume, Montesquieu and Blackstone, the
curriculum included moot courts and extensive legal writing.
Marshall's law notebook, a 238-page restatement of the law in
Virginia at the time, is the only source material that survives
documenting the nature of legal education in the United States
between the Revolution and the formation of the Union under the
Constitution.9
Within ten years of completing his studies at William &
Mary, Marshall was the pre-eminent appellate lawyer in Virginia.
In 1786 he represented the heirs of Lord Fairfax, testing the
validity of the original royal grant to the vast acreage between the
Potomac and the Rappahanock."° After listening to Marshall
plead, William Nelson wrote Jefferson's secretary that Marshall
stood "at the head of the practice" in the state. 1 In the early
1790s, Marshall assumed the leading role defending pre-war
Virginia debtors against English creditors. 2 Teaming with Patrick
learned lawyer, in the sense in which this word is often employed; as his
acquaintance with the roman jurisprudence, as well as with the laws of
foreign counties, was not very extensive. He was what is called a
common law lawyer, in the best and noblest acceptation of the term. He
was educated for the bar at a period, when Digests, abridgments and all
the numerous facilities, which now smooth the path of the law student
were unknown.. .It was thus no easy task to become an able lawyer, and
it required no common share of industry and perseverance to amass
sufficient knowledge of the law, to make even a decent appearance in
the forum... Mr. Marshall succeeded, in a comparatively short time, to
master the elements of the common law, and to place himself at the
head of the profession in Virginia, on a level with a Randolph, a
Pendleton and a Wythe, names which will forever remain illustrious in
the legal profession. That this was not achieved without great labor will
readily be believed; and it affords convincing proof both of the energy of
character, which Mr. M. possessed, and of his aptitude for study and
reflection...
Id.
9. William F. Swindler, John Marshall's Preparationfor the Bar - Some
Observations on His Law Notes, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 207, 207-213 (1967);
Charles T. Cullen, New Light on John Marshall's Legal Education and
Admission to the Bar, 16 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 345, 345-351 (1972); See JEAN
EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL:

DEFINER OF A NATION

75-81 (1996)

(illustrating Marshall's education in the context of the time).
10. Hite v. Fairfax, 8 Va. (4 Call) 42 (1786).
11. Letter from William Nelson to William Short (Jan. 11, 1787) (on file
with William Short Papers, Library of Congress.).
12. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). The circuit court opinion is
in the same reporter. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 256 (1796). Chief Justice Jay's dissenting
opinion is mislabeled as Jones v. Walker, 13 Fed. Cas. 1060 (1796). See
Argument in the Circuit Court (May 29-30, 1793), in 5 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
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Henry to argue the case of Ware v. Hylton on circuit, Marshall won
a two-to-one decision that let the Virginians off the hook, Article
IV of the Treaty of Paris to the contrary notwithstanding.
Afterwards, John Nicholas wrote John Breckinridge in Kentucky
that all of the lawyers "acquitted themselves well, but most of all
our friend Marshall, it was acknowledged on all hands, excelled
himself in sound sense and argument."" Justice Iredell, who heard
the case on circuit, said, "I shall always remember the arguments I
have heard on this case. They have discovered an ingenuity and
power of reasoning fully equal to anything I have ever heard."14
The fact that Marshall eventually lost the case did not affect
his standing at the bar. By the mid-1790s his professional income
was double that of the governor of Virginia, and he repeatedly
declined federal appointments that would have curtailed his
practice. Washington offered to appoint him United States
attorney for Virginia in 1790; he tendered the attorney
generalship to him in 1795; and the ministry to France when
Monroe was relieved in 1796 - all of which Marshall declined.1"
Marshall also turned down John Adams' offer to succeed James
Wilson as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court in 1798.16
An even better gauge of Marshall's appellate ability is the
great manumission case of Pleasants v. Pleasants in 1799,
involving the potential freedom of over 400 slaves. This is the
largest manumission case in American history. 7 Marshall argued
on behalf of the testator, who wished to free his slaves if private
manumission should ever become legal in Virginia.
That
eventually occurred, and Marshall convinced the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals to set aside that hallowed precept of property
MARSHALL,

300 (Charles F. Hobson, ed. 1987) (outlining Marshall's

argument); see also Charles F. Hobson, The Recovery of British Debts in the
Federal Circuit Courts of Virginia, 1790 to 1793, 92 VA. MAG. HIST. BIO., 176200 (1984) (describing the details of the case).

13. Letter from John Nicholas to John Breckinridge (June 9, 1793) (on file
with Breckinridge Family Papers, Library of Congress) (Original emphasis).
14. 3 U.S. (Dall.) 199, 256-280 (1796).

15. Offer from George Washington to John Marshall (Sept. 30, 1789), in 2
THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 41-42 (Charles T. Cullen and Herbert A.
Johnson, eds., 1977); Decline offer from Marshall to Washington (Oct. 14,
1789), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 42-43; Offer from Washington to
Marshall (Aug. 26, 1795), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARHSALL 319; Decline

of offer from Marshall to Washington (Aug. 31, 1795), in 2 THE PAPERS OF
JOHN MARSHALL 320; Offer from Washington to Marshall (July 8, 1796), in 2
THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 31; Decline of offer from Marshall to
Washington (July 11, 1796), in 2 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 32-33.
16. Letter from John Adams to Pickering (Sept. 13, 1798), in 8 THE WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS 595 (Charles Francis Adams, ed. 1854); Letter from Pickering
to John Marshall (Sept. 20, 1798), in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS. at 5-6;
Letter from Marshall to Pickering (Sept. 28, 1798), in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS. at 507.
17. Pleasents v. Pleasents, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319 (1798).
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law, the rule against perpetuities, to allow the manumission to
take place. To set 400 slaves free in Virginia in 1799 while
swimming upstream against one of the most sacred canons of
property law is scarcely the accomplishment of a mediocre
solicitor. And if that is not convincing, consider the litigation over
the residue of the Fairfax estate during the 1790s in which
Marshall prevailed repeatedly over the State of Virginia. 8
Let me also take issue with the perception that Marshall was
an intensely partisan Federalist who used the Court to thwart Mr.
Jefferson. The fact is Marshall was among the most moderate of
Federalists. He was a political conciliator and consensus builder
who worked easily with the Republicans in the House of
Representatives, and with whom he voted repeatedly in 1800 to
repeal the Sedition Act. 9 His nomination later that year to be
Secretary of State was confirmed unanimously."° When Adams
appointed him Chief Justice in 1801, it was the High Federalists
who objected, not the Republicans." (In 1795 the Senate had
refused to confirm Washington's nomination of John Rutledge to
be Chief Justice, largely because of Rutledge's stance on the Jay
Treaty. If Marshall had been significantly out of step with
prevailing sentiment, or had been seen as the threat to the
incoming administration, there is no doubt but that a bitter fight
would have been waged in the Senate. Do not forget that Mr.
Jefferson was not only the president-elect, but the presiding officer
of the Senate as well.)
Once on the bench, Marshall worked assiduously to remove
the Court from politics. In Talbot v. Seeman, the first case to come
before the Marshall court," a highly charged prize case involving
the constitutionality of the quasi-war with France, Marshall
steered adroitly between Federalists supporting the war and
Republicans who were opposed. He brought the Justices to a
18. SMITH, supra note 9, at 164-168; Letter from John Marshall to Charles
Lee (Sept. 22, 1797), in 3 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 147-49 (William
Stinchcombe & Charles T. Cullen, eds., 1979).

19. 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 619, 621, 709-710, 713.
20. U.S. Senate, Resolution of Consent, May 13, 1800, Entry 342, Senate
Confirmation of Executive Appointments, RG59 (on file with National
Archives).
21. When Oliver Ellsworth stepped down as Chief Justice and John Jay
declined the post, most Federalists assumed the nod would go to William
Cushing, the senior associate Justice or to the next senior Justice, William
Paterson of New Jersey.

Instead, Adams chose Marshall.

The nomination

was a bitter pill to the High Federalists, who delayed confirmation for over a
week. Senator Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey wrote with dismay that
Marshall's nomination had been greeted by true Federalists "with grief,
astonishment, and almost indignation."

Letter from Jonathon Dayton to

William Paterson (January 20, 1801) (on file with William Paterson Papers,
New Jersey Historical Society.)
22. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
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unanimous decision, and struck a balance that won immediate
approval from all sides.23 Talbot v. Seeman is also the first case in
which there is a clearly labeled "Opinion of the Court," and the
decision represented a massive step toward establishing the
legitimacy of the Court as the authoritative interpreter of the
Constitution.
Even more compelling is the case of the United States v.
Schooner Peggy, an equally contentious prize case that placed the
Jefferson administration squarely at odds with the judiciary.24
The issue involved the seizure of the Peggy, an armed French
merchant vessel, during the latter days of the quasi-war. The ship
was taken into port, condemned as a prize in United States circuit
court, and ordered sold. One week after the court order, the
Convention of Mortfontaine was signed in Paris ending the quasiwar with France.25 Under the terms of the Convention, vessels
that had been captured but "not yet definitively condemned"
should be restored to their original owners. Since the court
judgment had not been executed when the Convention was signed,
Jefferson believed the Peggy was protected and ordered the
proceeds of the sale turned over to the French owners. The court
clerk refused to comply, and was sustained by Justice Cushing,
sitting on circuit, who held the President's order to be invalid.26
One of the principal difficulties facing the Supreme Court was that
the Convention of Mortfontaine had not been transmitted to the
Senate by Mr. Jefferson and was not yet part of the supreme law
of the land. Marshall went far out of his way to accommodate
Jefferson. Rather than take the opportunity to embarrass the
President, the Chief Justice allowed argument in the case to
proceed leisurely for well over a week, giving Jefferson time to
submit the treaty and obtain the Senate's advice and consent.
Argument in the case ended December 17; the Senate acted on
December 19;27 Mr. Jefferson promulgated the Convention the
23. The Philadelphia AURORA, the most outspoken of Republican journals,
applauded Marshall for examining "at length the arguments urged on each
side." The NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, the organ of Mr. Jefferson's party in
Washington, reprinted the entire text of the decision, explaining to readers its
importance. AURORA, Aug. 17, 1801; NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 17, 1801

(both on file with author).
24. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
25. Treaty with France (Sept. 30, 1800), in 2 TREATIES AND OTHER

INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 457 (Hunter Miller,
ed. 1931) [hereinafter TREATIES OF THE U.S.].

26. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
198-199 (1926).
27. Transmission from Jefferson to the Senate of the Convention of
Mortfontaine (Dec. 11, 1801), in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN
RELATIONS 345 (Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds. 1832). See
also The Senate Resolution, in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN

RELATIONS 345 (ratifying the convention).
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morning of December 21;"s and Marshall delivered the opinion of
the Court that afternoon, sustaining Jefferson's view based on the
treaty. Rather than make Jefferson look bad, Marshall delayed
the court's decision until the President could put the Convention of
Mortfontaine into effect.
If you look at Marbury v. Madison,29 or at what at the time
was a far more important case, Stuart v.Laird,3 you will see that
Marshall once again went far out of his way to avoid a
confrontation with Mr. Jefferson or the Republicans in Congress.
The High Federalists had intentionally maneuvered Marbury to
put the Court and the Executive on a collision course. If Marshall
had wanted to play that game, he would have issued the writ of
mandamus and all hell would have broken loose. Instead, he
artfully avoided the problem. And permit me to observe in
passing, that the great contribution of Marshall in Marbury was
not to find Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutional,
but to hold that the Constitution was law, and that as a legal
document it was justiciable before the courts. Many contemporary
scholars, taking their cues from Beveridge and Corwin, do not
wish to accept that Marshall struck a conciliatory stance at
Marbury, but I hold out to you the fact that the three principal
Republican journals of the period, the Aurora, the National
Intelligencer, and the New York Spectator waxed eloquent in
praise of Marshall's decision, each paper devoting at least two
entire issues to the holding.'
Stuart v. Laird illustrates even more clearly Marshall's
determination to avoid friction. As you know, the case involved
the constitutionality of the repeal of the Federalist-passed
Judiciary Act of 1801, 32 by the Republican Congress in 1802."3 The

effect of the repeal, among other things, was to vacate the
appointments of the sixteen circuit court judges (the famous
"midnight judges") who Adams had named during the waning days
of his term. The Federalists insisted the repeal violated Article
III, Section 1, of the Constitution that specifies "Judges... shall
hold their Offices during good behavior." Alexander Hamilton
urged that the repealing act be tested before the Supreme Court,
and a flood of litigation from deposed Federal judges ensued.
Marshall took the view that the authority given Congress under
28. Jefferson's proclamation ratifying the Convention, in 2 TREATIES OF

THE U.S., supra note 25, at 486-87.
29. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
30. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803).
31. AURORA, Mar. 23, 1803; AURORA, Mar. 26, 1803; NAT. INTELLIGENCER,
Mar. 18, 1803; NAT. INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 21, 1803; NAT. INTELLIGENCER,
Mar. 24, 1803; N.Y. SPECTATOR, Mar. 30 1803; N.Y SPECTATOR, Apr. 2, 1803
(all on file with author).
32. Act of February 13, 1801, 2 UNITED STATES STATUTES AT LARGE 89.

33. Act of March 8, 1802, 2 UNITED STATES STATUTES AT LARGE 132.
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Article III to determine the organization of the federal court
system was paramount, and that as a result the abolition of the
circuit court judgeships was valid. 3' Here again, if Marshall
wanted a fight, he could have found one. Instead, he advised his
old friend, Congressman James Bayard of Delaware, not to pursue
the matter.35 When the test case, Stuart v., Laird,came before him
on circuit, Marshall sustained the repealing act.36 And the week
following the decision in Marbury, the Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Paterson, unanimously upheld Marshall's
judgment. 7
The Burr trial, Albert Beveridge and Edward S. Corwin to the
contrary notwithstanding, was John Marshall's finest hour. 38
Senator Beveridge and Professor Corwin were not only skeptical of
civil liberty, but both assumed Aaron Burr was guilty. The fact
that Marshall rejected the common law doctrine of constructive
treason -the idea that conspiracy alone is sufficient to convictand that he hewed to the text of the Constitution, was dismaying
to both. Americans routinely believe that the Bill of Rights is
merely a restatement of the principles of the common law. Having
lived in Canada for thirty-five years, where the English common
law continues to flourish, let me assure you that the Bill of Rights
deliberately and intentionally goes far beyond the protection
afforded the individual at common law. Just as the Framers
rejected common law concepts of prior restraint and seditious libel
in adopting the First Amendment, so too did they reject the
doctrine of constructive treason. 9 As defined by Article III,
34. Article III, Section 1, states that "The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time establish ....
" U.S. CONST. Art III, § 1.
35. Letter from James Bayard to Richard Bassett (Apr. 19, 1802), in Papers
of James A. Bayard, 1796-1815, (Elizabeth Donnan, ed.), in ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1913, at 153
(1915). See also Letter from James Bayard to Alexander Hamilton (April 25,
1802), in THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 613-614, (Harold C. Syrett,
ed. 1987); Diary of Gouverneur Morris (April 24, 1802) (on file with the
Library of Congress) (detailing the events surrounding Marbury v. Madison).

36. There is no published record of Marshall's circuit court decision,
although the details are reported in the headnotes of the Supreme Court case

Stuart v. Laird,5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 298, 301-302 (1803).
37. Id.
38. U. S. v. Burr, (CCD, Va. 1807).

39. The premise of the common law doctrine of constructive treason, as
stated by Sir Edward Coke, is that "in treason all the participes criminis are
principals; there being... no accessories to the crime; and that every act, which
in the case of a felony, would render a man an accessory, will, in case of
treason, make him a principal." The origins of the rule are traced
authoritatively in St. George Tucker's edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, a
work cited repeatedly during the proceedings against Burr. 4 BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS

OF THE UNITED STATES.. .Appendix, Note b, "Concerning Treason," 41-47
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"Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying
War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them
Aid and Comfort." There must be an overt act, testified to by two
witnesses in open court.
Marshall, who had not yet broken irrevocably with Jefferson
-that would come in 1811 over the litigation launched by Edward
Livingston
against the
former
president 4 saw
the
Administration's determination to hang Burr as a rerun of the
political justice he had witnessed in Paris under the Directory in
1797-98. Presiding over circuit court in Richmond, he withstood
what amounted to a lynch mob. The Constitution, he instructed
the jury, required an overt act, testified to by two witnesses. The
prosecution, said Marshall, had not produced a single witness."
Acquittal followed in due course.
The Burr episode provides several additional examples of
Marshall's commitment to civil liberty. Aside from the subpoena
issued for papers in Mr. Jefferson's possession ("the president,
unlike the King of England, is not above the law"),42 Marshall
overturned the long-standing prosecutorial practice of fictitious
indictments. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, he said,
required that in "all criminal prosecutions the accused should... be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusations" against him.
A defendant could not defend himself, said the Chief Justice,
unless he knew accurately what he was charged with.4" Equally
important, in the preliminary case of Ex Parte Bollman and Ex
Parte Swartwout," the Supreme Court, speaking through
Marshall, rejected the government's attempt to try the defendants
in Washington rather than in the venue where the crime was
committed. That, too, said Marshall, was a violation of the Sixth
Amendment." With these holdings, Marshall breathed life into
two hitherto dormant provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Professor Benjamin Wright, whom I suggest was more
partisan than Marshall, claimed the Chief Justice stretched the

(1803).

Tucker, a stout-hearted Republican, maintained that the Framers
intentionally defined treason in the Constitution to preclude adoption of
constructive treason, and that they emphasized their determination by stating

that "Treason.. .shall consist ONLY in levying war against [the United
States], or in adhering to their enemies." Tucker said the ONLY was explicit

and he capitalized it to help make his point. The entire note is devoted to
rejecting the idea of constructive treason.
40. Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 Fed. Cas. 660 (C.C.D.Va. 1811).
41. Marshall's charge to jury (Aug. 31, 1807), in 7 THE PAPERS OF JOHN
MARSHALL 74-116 (Charles F. Hobson, ed. 1993).
42. 7 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 37-50 (Charles F. Hobson, ed. 1993).

43. Id.
44. Ex Parte Bollman and Ex Parte Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 76 (1807).
45. Id. at 101.
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Contract Clause for blatantly political purposes in the Yazoo case,
Fletcher v.Peck, in 1810.46 The issue, as you will recall, involved
the sale by a corrupt Georgia legislature of the land between the
Chattahoochee and the Mississippi: effectively, the states of
Alabama and Mississippi, some 35 million acres, to four New
England land companies for a penny-and-a-half an acre.47 The sale
was repealed by a subsequent legislature,48 and the Supreme
Court, speaking through Marshall, overturned that revocation,
holding the State of Georgia bound by the Contract Clause of the
Constitution.49
Professor Wright, looking at Fletcher v. Peck in the 1930s the high tide of Jeffersonianism- asserted that Marshall ignored
the Framers' intent by applying the Contract Clause to the State
of Georgia, severely restricting state sovereignty and the power of
political majorities in the process. ° Unfortunately, there is not
one shred of documentary evidence to support Wright's contention.
The Northwest Ordinance, enacted by Congress in July 1787,
unlike the Contract Clause of the Constitution, provided that no
law should be enacted in the territory "that shall in any manner
whatever interfere with private contracts... previously formed."'
In other words, Congress made it explicit in the Northwest
Ordinance that they were dealing only with private contracts. At
the Constitutional Convention six weeks later (August 28, 1787),
Rufus King moved to include a similar ban concerning private
contracts in the Constitution. The Committee of Style (Gouveneur
Morris, Dr. Johnson, King, Hamilton, and Madison), which
reported September 14, deleted the qualifying word "private" and
referred simply to contracts. If the Framers had wanted the

46. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
47. The State of Georgia's title to the Yazoo territory was far from clear.
The land was occupied by the great Indian tribes of the Southeast Confederacy
(Creeks, Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws), whose title had not been
extinguished. It was also claimed by Spain and the federal government. As
one historian has written, "No one could say what was the value of Georgia's
title, but however good the title might be, the State would have been fortunate
to make it a free gift to any authority strong enough to deal with the Creeks
and Cherokees alone." 1 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 303 (1889).
48. See 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: PUBLIC LANDS 156-158 (Walter Lowrie

and Matthew St. Clair Clarke, eds. 1832).

49. Article I, § 10. "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of
Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility." U.S. CONST. Art. I, §
10 See MAX FARRAND, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 440ff. (1911)

(for the debate in the Federal Convention pertaining to the Contract Clause.)
50. WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 15-18, 28-34.
51. ORDINANCE OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY art. 11 (1787).
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clause to apply merely to private contracts, they could easily have
left the word in.5"
Similarly, in the FederalistPapers, Madison in No. 44, and
Hamilton in No. 81, discuss the Contract Clause in general, allinclusive terms.53 Justice James Wilson, who played an equally
prominent role at the Convention, asked rhetorically in his opinion
in Chisholm v. Georgia, "What good purpose could this
constitutional provision secure if a state might pass a law
impairing the obligations of its own contracts, and be amenable,
for such a violation of right, to no controlling judiciary power?"54
Justice William Paterson, author of the "New Jersey Plan" at the
Convention, was even more explicit in Van Horn's Lessee v.
Dorrance when he held that the State of Pennsylvania could not
impair its own contractual obligations.55 In other words, aside
from the clear text of the Constitution itself, the fact that
Hamilton, Madison, Wilson, and Paterson all spoke of the Contract
Clause in general terms and did not restrict it to private contracts
appears to be conclusive.
Certainly Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School,
whom many consider to have been the pre-eminent American legal
scholar of the twentieth century, thought the Contract Clause was
all-inclusive. Writing four years after Benjamin Wright's book
appeared, Dean Pound, speaking of Marshall's usage, wrote:
Contract was then used, and was used as late as Parsons on
Contracts in 1853, to mean what the French now call actejuridique.
It might be called "legal transaction." Not merely contract as we now
understand it, but trust, will, conveyance, and grant of a franchise
are included.. .The writers on natural law considered that there
was a natural legal duty not to derogate from one's grant.. .This is
the explanation of Fletcher v. Peck and no doubt is what the
[Contract Clause] meant to those who wrote it into the Constitution.
God and the devil and the king were bound to contract and a fortiori
the Commonwealth.56
Theophilus Parsons, whom Dean Pound cited, is absolutely
clear. He began his highly regarded book on the Law of Contracts
with these words:
The law of contracts in its widest extent may be regarded as
including nearly all the law which regulates the relations of human
life. Indeed, it may be looked upon as the basis of human society.

52. 2 FARRAND, supra note 49, at 597.
53. THE FEDERALIST; A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS, WRITrEN IN FAVOUR OF
THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AS AGREED UPON BY THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,

SEPTEMBER 17, 1787 (Philadelphia, John and Archibald McLean, 1788).
54. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 464 (1793).

55. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800).
56. Roscoe Pound, The Charles River Bridge Case, 27 MASS. L. Q. num. 4,
17, 19-20 (1942).
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All social life presumes it, and rests upon it; for out of contracts,
expressed or implied, declared or understood, grow all rights, all
duties, all obligations, and all law. Almost the whole procedure of
human life implies, or, rather is, the continual fulfillment of
contracts."7
I leave it with you. Was Marshall the partisan who stretched
the Contract Clause for political purposes, or was it Wright, the
committed Jeffersonian, who bent the record to denigrate the great
Chief Justice?
The fact is, despite Professor Wright and the progressive
historians, Marshall was neither a judicial activist nor a political
partisan on the bench. As he himself expressed it:
The Constitution was not intended to furnish the corrective to every
abuse of power which may be committed by state governments. The
interest, wisdom, and justice of the representative body, and its
relations with its constituents, furnish the only security, where
there is no express contract, against unjust and excessive taxation,
as well as against unwise legislation generally."
Was Marshall a reactionary? He believed fervently in the
doctrine of unalienable rights including the right to acquire and
possess property, but he was equally dedicated to the protection of
the individual from tyrannical government. His position on a free
press and free speech, expressed most vigorously in a memorial to
French Foreign Minister Talleyrand in 1798, and later in his
staunch opposition to the Sedition Act, to say nothing of his service
on the committee of the Virginia ratification convention that
drafted the Bill of Rights and put him in the vanguard of the
defenders of individual liberty.59 But let me talk about three areas
that place Marshall far ahead of most of his contemporaries: his
attitude toward women, toward Native Americans, and toward
African Americans. Marshall believed deeply in female equality,
advocated their admission to higher education, and, on the
domestic scene, he was the very model of a modern husband. The
Chief Justice of the United States did all the household marketing
in Richmond, supervised the cleaning and cooking, and eased the
burden for his invalid wife in every way possible. Stories are rife
from the Richmond of that era of persons calling at the Marshall
home and being greeted at the door by the Chief Justice with a
broom in one hand and a dustpan in the other." But I believe it
was Harriett Martineau, the famous English feminist, who said it
best. Martineau knew Marshall well, and in 1838, three years

57. 1 THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 3 (1853).
58. Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830).
59. Letter from John Marshall to Talleyrand (April 3, 1798) in 3 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 428-459.
60. SMITH, supra note 9, at 376.
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after his death, she wrote that the Chief Justice:
maintained through life and carried to his grave a reverence for
women, as rare in its kind as in its degree. He brought not only the
love and pity.. .which they excite in the minds of the pure, but the
steady conviction of their intellectual equality with men, and with
this a deep sense of their social injuries. Throughout life he so
invariably sustained their cause that no indulgent libertine dared to
flatter and humour, no skeptic... dared to scoff at the claims of
61
women in the presence of Marshall.
The symposium has considered Marshall's attitude toward
Native Americans at length. I will not replough that ground,
except to mention two points. First, as a member of the Virginia
legislature in 1784, Marshall joined with Patrick Henry to sponsor
legislation to encourage the intermarriage of whites and Native
Americans." After the bill was defeated, Marshall wrote his friend
James Monroe that he and Henry believed the measure "would be
good for this country," but "our prejudices oppose themselves to
our interest and operate too powerfully for them."" The second
point relates to an incident at Marshall University two years ago.
The University was dedicating an elegant statue of John Marshall
(the only standing statue of Marshall extant), and the speaker that
afternoon was Chief Joe Bird, the principal chief of the Cherokee
Nation. Chief Bird flew to Marshall at his own expense (and in his
own private jet) to be present at the dedication because of the
great and continuing affection of the Cherokee Nation for John
Marshall.
As for African Americans, the issue of slavery as such never
61. See 1 HARRIETT MARTINEAAU, RETROSPECT OF WESTERN TRAVEL 150
(1838); see generally HARRIETT MARTINEAU, HARRIETr MARTINEAU'S
AUTOBIOGRAPHY (Maria Weston Chapman, ed. 1877) (containing favorable
references to the great Chief Justice); HARRIET MARTINEAU, SOCIETY IN
AMERICA (1962).
62. Both Henry and Marshall believed that the intermarriage of whites and
Indians would not only improve relations between the two but would lead to "a
better race of human beings." Henry's bill provided that every white man who
married an Indian woman should be paid 10 pounds in hard currency plus an
additional 5 pounds for each child - a substantial sum in 1784. If a white
woman should marry and Indian man, the bill provided that 10 pounds would
be deposited with the county court, which would be used to buy livestock for
them, that the couple should receive an additional 3 pounds annually for
clothes, and that every child born to the couple should be educated at state
expense between the ages of ten and twenty-one. The bill survived first and
second readings, but failed final passage because Henry had been elected
governor in the interim and thus was unable to lead the debate in the House.
See WILLIAM WIRT, SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF PATRICK

HENRY 170-174 (1848); see also 2 WILLIAM WIRT HENRY, PATRICK HENRY:
LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE, AND SPEECHES 218-219 (1891); 2 ROBERT DOUTHAT

MEADE, PATRICK HENRY: PRACTICAL REVOLUTIONARY 264-265 (1969).
63. Letter from John Marshall to James Monroe (Dec. 2, 1784), in 1 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 131 (Herbert A. Johnson, ed. 1974).
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came before the Marshall Court. But throughout his life, Marshall
opposed the "institution" and worked quietly for its abolition. He
believed that slavery was not only unjust and oppressive to blacks,
but pernicious and debilitating for whites. As the leader of the
Richmond bar, Marshall, in addition to the great manumission
case, Pleasants v. Pleasants, undertook numerous pro-bono cases
for African Americans and established the precedent before the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals that the child of a slave father
and an Indian mother (reflecting the Native American rule of
maternal descent) was a free person and not a slave.64 In The
Antelope in 1825, involving the seizure of a Spanish slave ship,
Marshall castigated the slave trade, held it was contrary to
natural law, that it could be sustained only by positive law, and
then proceeded to set free all but 39 of the 281 Africans at issue.
"That every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor,
is generally admitted. That no other person can rightfully deprive
him of those fruits, and appropriate them against his will, seems
to be the necessary result of this admission."65
Four years later in Boyce v. Anderson, Marshall addressed
one of the most heated questions of the time: was a slave a person
or an article of merchandise? Much to the dismay of southern
slaveowners, Marshall held a slave was a person. He "has volition,
and has feelings which cannot be entirely disregarded. He cannot
be stowed away as a common package. In the nature of things,
and in his character, he resembles a passenger, not a package of
goods."66 Repeatedly, Marshall urged that the government use the
proceeds from the sale of federal land in the West and buy freedom
for the slaves. 7 When the issue of emancipation came before the
Virginia legislature in 1832, Marshall's eldest son, Thomas
Marshall, representing Fauquier county, took the lead in pressing
its approval. Echoing the sentiments of the Chief Justice, Thomas
Marshall told the Virginia legislature that slavery was an "evil
that admits no remedy."6
64. Hannah v. Davis, (1787); see also 1 HELEN TUNNICLIFF CATTERALL,
JUDICIAL PAPERS CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 94-95

(Washington, D.C., Carnegie Institution, 1926); Hannah v. Davis Notes on
Argument in the General Court, in 1 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 218-220
(Herbert A. Johnson, ed. 1974).

65. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 119-120 (1825).
66. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 150, 156 (1829).
67. Writing to his son Edward Carrington Marshall in 1832, the Chief
Justice deplored Virginia's unwillingness to accept such federal assistance.
"We might do much," he wrote, "if our unfortunate political prejudices did not
restrain us from asking the aid of the federal government. As far as I can
judge that aid, if asked, could be freely and liberally given." Letter from John
Marshall to Edward Carrington Marshall (Feb. 15, 1832) (on file with the
Marshall Papers, Williamsburg, Virginia.)

68. VIRGINIA SLAVERY DEBATE 6 (Richmond, Va., Richmond Enquirer,
1832).
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In this context it is difficult to picture Marshall as a social
and economic reactionary. Indeed, it is simply not credible when
one places the accusation along side Marshall's sweeping opinion
in Gibbons v. Ogden, breaking the steamboat monopoly of Robert
Fulton and Robert Livingston, and establishing the basis for that
seamless web of commerce that characterizes the American
economy." One of my favorite anecdotes relates to Gibbons v.
Ogden and Marshall's fascination with industrial development.
The decision in Gibbons was rendered in March 1824, and the day
after the Court adjourned Marshall went to wharf in Washington
and boarded a steamboat for his return to Richmond. The Chief
Justice had never been on a steamboat before, and he wanted to
experience what it was like moving upriver against the powerful
current of the James. 0
There are two other misconceptions of Marshall I would like
to take issue with. The first is that the Chief Justice dominated
his colleagues and dictated their opinions. David Currie, in a not
entirely tongue-in-cheek article in the University of Chicago Law
Review, referred to the Marshall Court as "John Marshall and the
six dwarfs."7' The fact is that throughout his career Marshall
believed it was more important for the Court to speak with one
voice than to have his own way. Only once in thirty-five years did
Marshall dissent on a constitutional issue,7 and there is abundant
evidence that Marshall often modified his own views in conference
to attain unanimity. In Little v. Barreme, for example, the great
war powers case, Marshall, who wrote the Opinion of Court,
explicitly stated that he was yielding to his colleagues. After
setting forth his own views, Marshall said, "I acquiesce in [the
opinion] of my brethren... that the instructions [of the President]
cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act
which without those instructions would have been plain
trespass."73
Let me suggest that rather than John Marshall and the six
dwarfs, a more accurate image would be Shakespeare's "band of
brothers": the phrase used by Henry V at Agincourt, and the term
69. 22 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 1 (1824).
70. Letter from John Marshall to Mary W. Marshall (Mar. 23, 1824), in 10
THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 87 (Charles F. Hobson, ed. 2000).

71. David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A PreliminaryInquiry,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 466, 469 (1983); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Most
Insignificant Justice: Further Evidence, 50 U. CHI. L. REV., 481-501 (1983);
FELIX FRANKFURTHER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY,
AND WHITE 5 (1937) "Marshall himself, hard headed as he was and free from

obvious self-deception, would doubtless be greatly amused by the claim that he
was the whole of his Court." Id.
72. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
73. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804); see also Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 347, 366 (1808).

1126

The John MarshallLaw Review

[33:1109

employed by Lord Nelson after the Battle of the Nile to describe
the symbiotic relationship among his captains.74 Just as the
British victory over a superior French fleet required an instinctive
understanding by each captain of the rules of engagement, so the
unanimity of the Marshall Court required fundamental agreement
among the Justices as to the purposes and meaning of the
Constitution. Nelson's captains fought their ships independently,
just as the Justices of the Marshall Court arrived at their common
conclusions via different routes.
Marshall's colleagues on the bench were men of substantial
accomplishment. Let me also point out that except for Bushrod
Washington, all were appointed by Republican Presidents. Of the
six who served with Marshall from 1812 to 1823, the longest
period in which the membership of the Court did not change, four
had served on state supreme courts, two (Gabriel Duvall and
Thomas Todd) had been Chief Justices, and two (William Johnson
and Joseph Story) had been speakers of their state legislatures.
Brockholst Livingston was regarded as the nation's leading
authority on the new field of commercial law, and Joseph Story,
the first Dane Professor of Law at Harvard, a pioneer in the
establishment of legal education in the United States, and perhaps
the nation's leading legal scholar of the first half of the nineteenthcentury.75
It is true that the unanimity of the Marshall Court was not
accidental. In the thirty-five years Marshall was Chief Justice,
the Court rendered approximately 1200 decisions, of which 1104
were unanimous. But in many respects that unanimity was as
much attributable to the warmth of Marshall's personality as to
the clarity of his intellect. The first thing Marshall did when he
was appointed Chief Justice in 1801 was to arrange for the justices
to live at the same hotel. They took their meals together, usually
walked to and from the Court together, and when they socialized
in Washington, they usually did so together. After dinner in the
evening, they would clear the table and discuss the cases that had
been argued, usually over some of Marshall's fine Madeira. 6

74. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V, act 4, sc.3. 3 THE DISPATCHES OF
VICE ADMIRAL LORD NELSON IV, (Sir Nicholas Harris Nicolas, ed. 1840).
75. See generally R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE STORY
(1985).
76. President Josiah Quincy of Harvard, a friend of Story's, once
accompanied the Justice to Washington. When Quincy inquired about the

city, Story warned him that "I can do very little for you there, as we judges
take no part in the society of the place. We dine once a year with the
President, and that is all. On other days we take our dinner together, and

discuss at table the questions which are argued before us. We are great
ascetics, and even deny ourselves wine, except in wet weather."

Quincy reports that Story paused at that point, as if thinking that the
act of mortification he had mentioned placed too severe a tax upon human
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Today's Friday conference of the Justices traces to those evening
discussions, and the Opinion of the Court, that unique American
innovation, to them as well.
The final misconception I would like to address is that
Marshall and Jackson were implacable enemies, and that the
hostility between them poisoned relations between the executive
and the judicial branches. Here again, the facts stand to the
contrary. 7 It is true that Jackson was elected on a states rights
platform in 1828, but like Marshall, he was a devout believer in
the Union. When South Carolina attempted to nullify the Tariff
Act in 1832, Jackson not only dispatched federal troops under
General Winfield Scott to Charleston, but in his proclamation to
the people of South Carolina he quoted approvingly from
Marshall's powerful opinions in McCulloch v. Maryland and
Cohens v. Virginia. Jackson said the Supreme Court was the
ultimate arbiter of the constitutionality of the nation's laws, and
that if the Court held a statute to be constitutional, it must be
obeyed.78
At the White House dinner given for the Court shortly
afterwards, Marshall, in returning the president's toast, compared
Jackson's action in South Carolina to Washington's quelling of the
Whiskey Rebellion in 1794.7" Afterwards, Story wrote his wife:
"The Chief Justice and myself have become [Jackson's] warmest
supporters, and shall continue so just as long as he maintains the

credulity, and presently added: "What I say about wine, sir, gives you our rule;
but it does sometimes happen that the Chief Justice will say to me, when the
cloth is removed, 'Brother Story, step to the window and see if it looks like
rain.' And if I tell him that the sun is brightly shining, Judge Marshall will
sometimes reply, 'All the better, for our jurisdiction extends over so large a
territory that the doctrine of chances makes it certain that it must be raining
somewhere.' JOSEPH QUINcY, FIGURES OF THE PAST 89-90 (Boston, Roberts
Brothers, 1883).

77. When Jackson came to Washington prior to his inauguration in March
1829, he and Marshall stayed at the same hotel and apparently enjoyed each
other's company. Marshall wrote his wife Polly that the President-elect "feels
the loss of Mrs. Jackson very seriously. It would be strange if he did not. A
man who at his age [Jackson was sixty-one] loses a good wife loses a friend

who cannot be replaced." Letter from John Marshall to Mary W. Marshall
(Feb. 1, 1829) (on file with the Marshall Papers, Williamsburg, Va.); see also
Sallie E. Marshall Hardy, John Marshall as Son, Brother, Husband, and

Friend, 8 THE GREEN BAG 479 (1896).
78. See 1 MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, 378386 (Kermit L. Hall, ed. 1992); see also WARREN, supra note 26, at 779. Years

later, as he lay near death, Jackson said he regretted only two things in his
life: that no horse raised by him had ever beaten a Diomede filly named

Haynie's Maria - and that he had not hung John C. Calhoun for treason.
SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OxFoRD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
501 (1965).
79. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (Dec. 25, 1832) (on file with
the Marshall Papers, Williamsburg, Va.).
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principles [of his message to the South Carolinians]. Who would
have dreamed of such an occurrence?"" Note also that the year
was 1832.
Nine months before, Marshall had delivered the
opinion of the Court in Worcester v. Georgia,81 and if that affected
the relationship between Marshall and Jackson, it is certainly not
evident. As for Jackson's alleged remark after Worcester, "John
Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it," the
statement was put into Jackson's mouth by Horace Greeley in
1864, almost twenty years after Jackson's death." Not only did
Jackson never make the remark, but the Court's decision in
Worcester required no action whatever by the Executive."
More to the point, perhaps, during Marshall's tenure as Chief
Justice, Jackson had the opportunity to make four appointments
to the Court. In each instance he could have appointed a vigorous
states rights Republican. Indeed, in several instances they were
the odds-on favorite. Yet each time, to the consternation of some
of his most ardent supporters, Jackson appointed a judicial
moderate.84 Historians and others usually overlook the fact that
Jackson had been a justice on the Supreme Court of Tennessee for
two years, and he had no desire to politicize the Supreme Court of
the United States.
Jackson's eulogy to Marshall speaks for itself. "Although I
have sometimes dissented from the constitutional expositions of
Judge Marshall," said Jackson, "I have always set a high value
upon the good he has done for his country. The judicial opinions of
John Marshall were expressed with the energy and clearness
80. Letter from Joseph Story to Sarah W. Story (Jan. 27, 1832), in LIFE AND
LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 119 (William Westmore Story, ed. 1851).
81. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
82. 1 HORACE GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CONFLICT 106 (1864).
83. Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 525-530 (1969); R. Kent Newmyer, On
Assessing the Court in History, STAN. L. REV. 540, 544-547 (1969).
84. When Robert Trimble of Kentucky died in 1826, Jackson passed over
Senator John Rowan, an outspoken opponent of the Court, and nominated the

strongly nationalist John McLean of Ohio, who had served as postmaster
general under John Quincy Adams. When Bushrod Washington died in 1830,
Jackson appointed Henry Baldwin of Pennsylvania, not the chief judge of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, John Bannister Gibson, whose critique of
Marbury v. Madison in the state case of Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 320

(Pa. 1825), is reprinted in virtually every textbook on constitutional law. In
1834, to replace William Johnson of South Carolina, Jackson chose
Congressman James M. Wayne of Georgia, another judicial moderate and a
strong nationalist. When Gabriel Duvall of Maryland stepped down that same

year, Jackson nominated his former Attorney General and Secretary of the
Treasury, Roger Brooke Taney. The Senate did not confirm Taney, but
Marshall, who respected Taney's ability, wrote to Virginia's senators urging
his confirmation. See Marshall to Senator Benjamin Watkins Leigh, quoted in
1 SAMUEL TYLER, A MEMOIR OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY, L.L.D.: CHIEF
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 63 (1872).
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which were peculiar to his strong mind, and gave -him a first rank
among the greatest men of his age."85
I could talk endlessly about John Marshall. But "endless" is a
word a closing speaker at an all-day symposium should never use.
I am reminded of the World Series in 1992 when the Blue Jays
played the Braves. David Wells was pitching for Toronto and was
being shelled unmercifully. Cito Gaston, the Blue Jay manager,
went to mound to relieve Wells. Wells, who was always mouthy,
told Gaston he wasn't tired. Gaston said, "I know, but the
outfielders are."
I'm not tired, but I know you must be. Thank you very much.

85. Letter from Andrew Jackson to Horace Binney (Sept. 18, 1835) (on file
with the Jackson Papers, Library of Congress).
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